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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

Jayni Searle,

}

Appellant,
Case No. 990726-CA
v.
Boyd Searle,
Appellee.
i

Priority 4

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which cisnissed
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Assistance on a May 22, 193S
Order from the Fort Peck Trial Court.

The Utah Court of Appeals

has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §"'?2a-3 (2) (a) (1999) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review in this case are:
I.

Did the trial court err in concluding that the Writ of

Assistance did not comply with the Utah Foreign Judgment Ac;?
This issue presents a question of law that does not require

1

deference to the trxal court.

Marquiles By and Through Marquiles

v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (Utah 1985).
II.

Did the Trial Court err when it determined that the Tribal

Court's May 22, 1998 Order, which transferred custody, iackea aue
process with respect to Appellee?

This issue presents a question

of law that does not require deference to the trial court.
Marquiles By and Through Marquiles v. Upchurch, 696 P.2a 1195,
1199-1200 (Utah 1985).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Appellant believes the following statutes and constitut_onal
provisions are determinative of this appeal.
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const., Amend. 5, 14
Utah Const. Art. 1, §7
Utah Const. Art. 1, §24.
Statutory Provisions
25 U.S.C. 1914
UTAH CODE ANNO.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 30-6-4.2 & 4.3 (1999)
§78-22a-l et. seq.

(1999)

UTAH CODE ANNO.

§78-22a-2(2) (1999)

UTAH CODE ANNO.

§78-22a-3 (1999)

UTAH CODE ANNO.

§78-22a-3(2) (1999)

UTAH CODE ANNO.

§78-22a-6 (1999)
2

Rules of Procedure
Rule 4-501(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 65A of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS
Overview:
An Action was commenced on May 28, 1998 in the Third
District Court (herein after "District Court") to enforce a May
22, 1998 Order from the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal
Court (herein after "Tribal Court") , the Honorable Judge TimothyHanson presiding.

The May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order was

entered after jurisdiction over an action was transferrec
pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act by the Third District
Juvenile Court (herein after "Juvenile Court").
Background:
Appellee commenced suit in the Juvenile Court against
Appellant in February of 1998, seeking termination of Appellant's
parental rights.

(See R. at 326-27).

mother of Chad Searle ("Chad").

Appellant is the natural

(See R. at 326). Appellees

filed an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Custody in the Juvenile
Court, prior to serving Appellant with the Petition to Terminate
Appellant's Rights (herein "Termination Petition").
326-27).

(See R. at

On or about the 3rd day of March, 1999, the Juvenile
3

Court entered an ex parte Order granting temporary custoay of
Chad to Appellee.

(See R. at 326-27).

On or about March 19, 1998, pursuant to the section 104 of
the Indian Child Welfare Act, a Petition to Invalidate and Vacare
the Ex Parte Custody Order (herein after "Invalidation Petition";
was filed in the Third District Juvenile Court by Appellant.
(See R. at 327).

The Petition sought to vacate the March 3,

1998 Juvenile Court Ex Parte Order of temporary custody.

(See R.

at 328).
Appellant also filed a Petition to Transfer (herein after
"Transfer Petition") the Juvenile Court matter to Tribal Court.
(See R. at 327).

In April of 1998, Appellee and Appellant

agreed that the issues raised in the Invalidation Petition cc~ld
be determined by the Court with jurisdiction after the Juvenile
Court ruled on jurisdictional issues in the Transfer Petition.
(See R. at 357 (paragraph 4)). The Juvenile Court, the Tribal
Court, and the Fort Peck Tribes, were never notified of nor privy
to this agreement between the Appellant and Appellle.

(See R. at

357 (paragraph 4)). Jurisdiction over the Juvenile Court action
was transferred from the Juvenile Court to the Tribal Court
pursuant to an order entered on May 15, 1998.

(See R. at 6 &

Addenda " A " ) .
On May 22, 1999, the Fort Peck Tribal Court accepted
jurisdiction and transferred placement of Chad to the reservation

4

and temporary custody to Appellant.

(See R. at 9 & Addenda "B").

On or about May 28, 1998, Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of
Assistance in the District Court seeking to enforce the Tribal
Court May 22, 1998 Order.

(See R. at 1 & Addenda "C").

Attached

to the Petition for Writ of Assistance was a certified copy of
the May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order granting Appellant temporary
custody.

(See R. at 9).

The District Court scheduled and held a

telephonic hearing on June 2, 1998, Judge Timothy Hanson
presiding.

(See R. at 11). Present telephonically at the

hearing were: Appellant's counsel, Jim C. Shirley; and Appellee's
counsel, Maria C. Santana.

(See R. at 11).

The Court indicated

that it would issue the Writ of Assistance unless Appellee sought
and obtained the assistance of another Court to stay the Writ of
Assistance.

(See R. at 11).

On June 3, 1998, the Juvenile Court, Judge Olof A. Johansson
presiding, issued a stay of its May 15, 1998 order.
328).

(See R. at

Appellant's counsel contacted the Third District Court and

informed the Court Clerk that Appellant would not execute on ir_e
Writ of Assistance pending a resolution of the Juvenile Court's
June 3, 1998 Stay.

(See R. at 55-56).

On June 8, 1998, a telephonic hearing was held before ihe
Juvenile Court, Judge Olof A. Johansson presiding.
328).

(See R. at

Jointly with the Juvenile Court hearing, a telephonic

hearing was also held before the Tribal Court, Judge A.T. Stafni
5

presiding.

(See R. at 328).

The hearings were telephonically

held so that both Courts and all counsel could participate.
Appellant's counsel and Appellee's counsel were both present ir.
person at the Juvenile Court site.

Gary Beaudry, counsel for the

Tribes, was present at the Tribal Court site.

(See R. at 211).

Counsel were allowed to address both Courts.
211).

(See R. at

Both Courts stated their respective positions.

When it

became clear that the Court's could not resolve their respective
positions, the Juvenile Court stayed the May 15, 1998 order
pending review by a "higher court."

(See R. at 328). The Tribal

Court also stayed its order pending review by a "higher court."
(See R. at 328).
Appellant filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief seeking
review of the Juvenile Court's June 8, 1998 Stay (Case No.
981352-CA).

This Court vacated the Juvenile Court's Stay on

September 1, 1998.

(See R. at 110). The litigation resumed in

the Fort Peck Tribal Court.
filed a Petition for Custody.

On September 8, 1998, Appellant
(See R. at 329). The Petition

for Custody was served upon Appellee's counsel pursuant to the
Tribal Court's Rules of Civil Procedure (and Rule 5 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure).

(See R. at 329). On September, 9,

1998, the Fort Peck Tribal Court dismissed the Petition for
Termination of Parental Rights pursuant to Appellee's request and
Appellant's stipulation (however the Tribal Court retained

6

jurisdiction over the custody matters pending before in
Appellant's Petition for Sole Custody.

(See R. at 329).

On September 10, 1998, Appellant moved that the District
Court issue a Writ of Assistance.

(See R. at 55-56).

Appellee

filed a Notice of Appeal seeking review of the May 15, 1996
Juvenile Court Order (which transferred jurisdiction).:

(See R.

at 68). On September 16, 1998, the District Court sent a letter
to the parties stating that it would hold off decision pending
the appeal filed by Appellee regarding the May 15, 1998 Juvenile
Court Order transferring jurisdiction.

(See R. at 55-56).

On October 16, 1999, the Fort Peck Tribal Court granted a
default judgment in favor of Appellant on her September 8, 1998
Petition for Sole Custody.

(See R. at 322-324).

On November

19, 1999, the Fort Peck Tribal Court held an Order to Show Cause
hearing.

(See R. at 326-333).

Appellee failed to appear for the

hearing after being served with notice to appear pursuant to the
Tribal Court's Order.

(See R. at 326-333).

The Tribal Court

held Appellee in contempt and ordered the child returned to the
reservation in its November 23, 1998 Order on the Order tc Show
Cause.

(See R. at 326-333).

On December 12, 1999, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal

1

Appellee also served a Petition for Extraordinary
Relief against Judge Hanson of the District Court upon Appellant,
but did not file the same or serve the Court with the same.
(See R. at 55-56).

7

filed by Appellee regarding the Juvenile Court's May 15, 1998
order.

(See R. at 146). On December 18, 1999, Appellant

requested issuance of a Writ by the District Court.
153-150).

(See R. at

The Court scheduled a hearing on February 5, 1999.

(See R. at 206). The hearing was rescheduled several times and
was finally held on March 8, 1999.
No evidence was taken.
Transcript.

(See R. at 206-334).

Only argument was offered. See

First, the Court found that the Petition for Writ of

Assistance did not comply with the provisions of the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act.

(See Transcript at page 32 lines 19-20).

The

Court indicated that the sole method of enforcement was through
the Foreign Judgment Act.

(See Transcript at page 32 lines 3-5).

Second, the Court found that the May 22, 1999 order coulc r.ot be
enforced because the order lacked due process.
at page 33 lines 4-8).

(See Transcript

The Court based this lack of due process

finding on the fact that the order was issued Ex Parte on May 22,
1998 (i.e. Appellee did not receive notice of the Fort Peck
Tribes' Motion and, therefore, were not heard at the ex parte
hearing) .

(See Transcript at page 33 lines 4-8) .

An oraer v;as

entered on July 26, 1999 by the District Court on the March 13,
1999 hearing.

(See R at 453-57) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Method of Enforcement:

The District Court ruled that zhe

8

only method of enforcement of a Foreign Judgment is through the
process outlined under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
to the District Court's ruling,

UTAH CODE ANNO.

Contrary

§78-22a-6 (1999

(entitled Optional Procedure) provides that the Foreign Judgment
Act (Utah Code Anno. §78-22a-l et. seq.

(1999)) does not "impair

a judgment creditor's right to bring an action in this state to
enforce" a foreign judgment.

Appellant simply filed an action to

enforce the custody order of a foreign jurisdiction as is
provided for in the Foreign Judgment Act.

Additionally, Appellee

was provided all the procedural protections that are allowed
under the Foreign Judgment Act.
Due Process: The District Court ruled that the Tribal Court
May 22, 1998 Order lacked due process in that Appellee was
entitled to notice prior to the Tribal Court's decision.
Contrary to the District Court's finding, Appellee was granted
due process.

First, Appellee had ample notice of the

Invalidation Petition which requested that the March 3, 1998 Ex
Parte Juvenile Court Order which granted temporary custody to
Appellee be vacated.

The Tribal Court had jurisdiction and a

duty to immediately vacate the Juvenile Court's March 3, 1998
Order. (See 25 U.S.C. 1914).
Second, Appellee was afforded an opportunity for a hearing
in which Appellee could contest the Order.
a hearing was held.

On June 8, 1998, such

On June 8, 1998, the Tribal Court ever.

9

stayed its order, inviting a review by a "'Higher Court.

The

subsequent hearing complied with the general requirements for
such an order (i.e. that any ex parte order must be followed by a
hearing on the Motion that resulted in the order).

Appellee's

chose not to contest the Order through an appeal to the Tribal
Court's Appellate Court or renew a fight for custody.
Additionally, Appellee chose not to contest the subsequent
custody action in Tribal Court, which resulted in a permanent
custody order.

Appellee had due process, but chose not to avail

himself of the process provided.

ARGUMENT
A.

FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT COMPLIANCE

The District Court ruled that the only way to enforce a
foreign judgment was through the Foreign Judgment Act.
Additionally, the District Court Ruled that Appellant had failed
to comply with the provisions of the Foreign Judgment Act.

Both

of these rulings are erroneous in that there are alternatives to
the Foreign Judgment Acts provisions and Appellant substantially
complied with the Foreign Judgment Acts' provisions.
1.

Alternatives to the Foreign Judgment Act

UTAH CODE ANNO.

§78-22a-6 (1999) provides that "this chapter

shall not be construed to impair a judgment creditor's right: to
bring an action in this state to enforce such creditor's

10

judgment."

"The judgment holder still has the option, however,

to commence an enforcement action under the older, traditional
approach."

Pan Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1143 (titan

1991) . The traditional method of enforcing a judgment was re
file an action on the judgment in Utah. Id.
A Petition for Writ of Assistance is an action to enforce
the provisions of a judgment in Utah.

Under current case lav; and

the statutory constructs of the Foreign Judgment Act, it seems
clear that the Petition for Writ of Assistance should have beer, a
viable alternative action to enforce the foreign judgment of rhe
Tribal Court.

The Writ of Assistance was an appropriate mezhoa

in which to address the child custody issue which was involved in
the enforcement of the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order.

2.

Compliance with the Foreign Judgment Act

Contrary to the District Court's Order of Dismissal, the Kay
22, 1998 Tribal Court Order was domesticated in that an original
certified copy was filed with the Clerk of the Court when the
Petition for Writ of Assistance was filed.

In Holm v. Smilowitz,

840 P.2d 157 , 163 (Utah App. 1992), this Court noted:
The specific langauge of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22a-2(2)
(1992) reads: "A copy of the foreign judgment
authenticated in accordance with an appropriat act of
Congress...may be filed with the clerk of any district
court in Utah. ... "The judgment holder still has the
option to commence an enforcement action under the
older, traditional approach." Footnote 2.

11

Clearly, Appellant had the option to enforce the action or
to register the action in accordance with the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act.

Unlike the Smilowitz, Appellant filed an

authenticated/certified copy of the Order with the Court.
Thereby placing before the Court, an order which was
registered/domesticated with the Court.
While the District Court did not address exactly how
Appellant failed to comply with the Foreign Judgment Act, i~ is
clear that the relevant provisions were substantially complied
with through alternative procedures.

First, an original

certified copy of the judgment was filed as required by
ANNO.

UTAH CODB

§78-22a-2(2) (1999) ("A copy of a foreign judgment

authenticated in accordance with an appropriate act of Congress
or an appropriate act of Utah may be filed with the clerk of any
district court in Utah).

(See R. at 8 ) .

was appropriately certified.

The Tribal Court order

(See R. at 8 ) .

Second, the Appellee was given notice that Appellant was
seeking to enforce the judgment in Utah.
not take place in the method prescribed by

While this notice did
UTAH CODE ANNO.

§75-22a-

3 (1999), such notice was given when, in accordance with Rule 3
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellee's attorney was
served with a copy Petition for Writ of Assistance with a copy of
the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order attached.

(See R. at 4 ) .

While an affidavit detailing the judgment debtors address was not
12

submitted as required by

UTAH CODE ANNO.

§78-22a-3(2) (1999), a

cover sheet was filed which detailed the judgment debtor's last
known address.
The procedural protections of the Foreign Judgment Act were
met.

As argued above, the Foreign Judgment Act was not the

vehicle for enforcement.

However, Appellee was given ail the

procedural protections of the Foreign Judgment Act, in spite of
the Appellant's exercise of the option to pursue an independent
action to enforce the judgment.

Accordingly, Appellee was not

denied any process which was owed under the Foreign Judgment Act.
B.

DUE PROCESS AFFORDED

The District Court also ruled that Appellee was not afforded
Due Process in that the May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order was
granted without notice to Appellee. This ruling was erroneous.
In reviewing an order under the Foreign Judgment Act, the
reviewing Court should look to see if the foreign judgment is
valid and final.

See Estate of Jones, Matter of, 858 P.2d 983,

985 (Utah 1993) (If the judgment meets the validity and finality
criteria, "it is entitled to full faith and credit").

While

Estate of Jones dealt with the enforcement of the order under the
Foreign Judgment Act, the analysis regarding the viability and
enforceability of the foreign order should be basically the same
for an enforcement action because the core issues are the same.
Appellant would propose that the Court should use such an
13

analysis in reviewing the District Court's conclusion that the
foreign order lacked due process.
The District Court's order addressed only the validityportion of the analysis.

However, since both prongs were raised

and pled below, Appellant will address both the validity and
finality issue as they relate to the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998
Order.

As specifically set forth below, the Tribal Court's May

22, 1998 Order is both valid and final.
1.

Validity

"In order to be 'valid' for purposes of full faith and
credit, a judgment must have been rendered by a court with
competent jurisdiction." Estate of Jones, Matter of, 858 F.2d
983, 985 (Utah 1993). If the rendering court had competent
jurisdiction, the order must have been issued "in compliance with
the constitutional requirements of due process."

Estate cf

Jones, Matter of, 858 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1993).
A.

Competent Jurisdiction

The original action involving Appellant's custodial rights
was commenced in the Juvenile Court by Appellee.

Pursuant to

relevant provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act, jurisdiction
over the Juvenile Court matter was transferred to the Tribal
Court.
System.

This issue was litigated to finality in the Utah Court
Pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act, the tribal

court is the preferred forum for resolution of custody issues

14

involving "Indian" children.

Adoption of Hallowav, Matter of,

732 P.2d 962, 966 (Utah 1986).
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
determination of the custody of an "Indian" child is "squarely"
in the tribal court's hands. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
v. Holvfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52, 109 S.Ct. 1507, 1610, 104 L.Ed. 2d
29,

(1989).

Based upon the transfer of jurisdiction under

the Indian Child Welfare Act and the above-cited case law, ~he
Tribal Court was a court of competent jurisdiction which had the
authority to determine the custody issues involved.
B.

Due Process

Based upon the fact that the Tribal Court was a "court of
competent jurisdiction," the Court should look to see if the
order passed constitutional muster.

This Court has previously

recoqnized that the demands of due process rest on the concept cf
basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to
the case and just to the parties involved.
P.2d 157, 164 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting
P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting
City, 610 P.2d 338, 341, (Utah 1980)).

Holm v. Smilowitz 840

Wiscombe v. Wiscombe, 744
Rupp v. Grantsville
"One of the fundamental

requisites of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard"
and notice.

Icl. Appellee's due process rights were not violated

under Utah State Constitution or under the United States
Constitution.
15

(i)

Invalidation Petition

Under Utah law that a judge may enter an order without a
hearing where a party was served with a pleading and either fails
to respond or fails to file a request for hearing.2

Rule 4-

501(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration
specifically provides that "a decision on a motion shall be
rendered without a hearing unless ordered by the Court or
requested by the parties."

Rule 4-501(3) (F) also provides -hat a

hearing shall be deemed waived if no written request for a
hearing is made.

Rule 55 allows the Court to enter judgment by

default in cases where the responding party fails to respond
within the time period allotted.
Under these provisions, the Juvenile Court would have been
well within its discretion to rule on the Issues in Appellant's
Invalidation Petition at any time subsequent to the lapse of time
for a Response because by failing to memorialize the April
agreement or by failing to file a Response, Appellee waive his
right to a hearing.

Additionally, a ruling on Appellant's

Invalidation Petition was mandated under Federal Law. See Section
104 of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1914.

Appellee's

due process rights would not have been violated if the Juvenile
Court had taken such an action.

Appellee was served and had an

2

See Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration and Rule 55 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

16

opportunity to preserve his rights in relation to the Petition 10
Invalidate.

If the Juvenile Court had done so,

Appellee would

have been obligated to either file an appeal or move to vacate
the order if Appellee wanted relief from such an order.
While in April of 1998, Appellee and Appellant had agreed
that a responsive pleading was needed only after the issue of
jurisdiction was decided.

The agreement was never communicated

to the Juvenile Court or the Tribal Court by either party.3

The

Juvenile Court and, subsequently, the Tribal Court were net bound
by the un-memorialized agreement.
The Juvenile Court could have disposed of the Invalidation
Petition at any time.

The Juvenile Court could have made a

ruling either granting or denying the Motion without a hearing
under Rule 4-501 or Rule 55.

While the parties would be entitled

to notice that the ruling had been issued, the parties were not
entitled to notice that the Juvenile Court would be issuing a
ruling because such Notice was provided when the pleading was
served.
If the Juvenile Court was entitled to dispose of the
Petition to Invalidate as set forth above, the Tribal Court, upon

3

While the parties did agree on May 1, 1998, that the
Juvenile Court should only consider the Transfer Petition prior
to ruling on any other issues, the parties did not communicate
that agreement was reached earlier in April with regard to the
Invalidation Petition. The May 1, 1998 only addressed the
Transfer Petition.

17

retaining jurisdiction, clearly acquired the same right.
Accordingly, the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order did not lack
due process in that Appellee waived any right to a hearing byfailing to submit, at the very least, a written or oral request
for hearing on the Invalidation Petition.

The Tribal Court hac a

duty under the Indian Child Welfare Act, Section 104, to
invalidate and vacate the Juvenile Court's March 3, 1998 Order
because it was improperly entered.
A subsequent order from the Tribal Court indicates that the
Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order involved a decision to
invalidate the Juvenile Court's March 3, 1998 Ex Parte Order.
(See R. at 327-28).

In the Tribal Court's November 23rd, 1998

Order, the Tribal Court found:
16. Ms. Searle filed a Petition to invalidate the
improperly entered custody order, citing to 25 U.S.C.
1914 and alleging violations of 1912(a, d,& e ) .
17. Boyd and Dorthy Searle filed a Response to the
Amended Petition to Transfer, alleging that domicile
had not changed at the death of the emotional father
and that Jayni Searle had abandoned the child, Chad
Searle.
18. Ms. Searle filed a Reply which cited to case law
which demonstrated that under common law domicile did
change at the death of a custodian to the surviving
natural parent and which alleged grounds to demonstrate
that Ms. Searle had not abandoned the child.
19. On May 15th, 1998, the Third District Juvenile
Court, in and for the state of Utah issued an order
transferring jurisdiction to tribal court.
20.

On May 22nd, 1998, this Court found that it is has
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exclusive jurisdiction and accepted jurisdiction.
Additionally, the Court invalidated the previous order
granting custody to Boyd and Dorothy Searle and ordered
that the child be brought back to the reservation and
placed in the custody of the natural mother. (See R.
at 327-28). Emphasis added.
The District Court had this evidence before it, but did net
consider this evidence in making its ruling.
entitled to Full Faith and Credit.

This evidence was

Rather than considering the

evidence, the District Court did not look at the surrounding
circumstances at the entry of the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998
Order.

The District Court limited itself to the May 22, 1998

Order.

(See Transcript Page 17 at 5-8).

However, a full review of the facts before the Court, the
Tribal Court's order did not lack due process because Appellee
had notice of the Invalidation Petition and had an opportunity uo
be heard on the issues raised therein.

The subsequent orders

should have been consider to place a context for the ruling and
the facts which were before the Tribal Court.
ii.

Notice through the Juvenile Court's May 15, 1998 Order

The Juvenile Court's May 15, 1998 Order also left the
discretion over custody with the Tribal Court.

(See R. at 6 ) .

The Order states as follows:
1.
The Verified Petition to Terminate Parental Rights
of Jayni Searle is hereby transferred to the Tribal
Court, as requested by the mother, for said Court's
determination as to whether or not it wishes to
exercise jurisdiction over this matter.
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2.
Pending such a determination by the Tribal Court,
this Court directs that its Order of 3-3-98, placing
temporary custody and guardianship of said child with
the Petitioners, shall remain in full force and effect,
and that said child remain in his current placement
until the Tribe makes its determination. Emphasis
added.
(See R. at 6 ) .
The Tribal Court clearly had the discretion to change or
modify the order in that there was no provision for its continued
enforcement following acceptance of jurisdiction by the Tribal
Court.

Appellee was given notice that the Juvenile Court March

3, 1998 Order only had full force and effect until the Tribal
Court made its determination on jurisdiction.

Appellee did

nothing with this knowledge.
iii.

Standard for Ex Parte

Type Orders

There are several provisions which allow a Court to enter an
Ex Parte Order.

The Utah Cohabitant Abuse Act provides that the

Court may issue an Ex Parte
held within 20 days.

See

Order, but requires that a hearing be
UTAH CODE ANNO.

§ 30-6-4.2 & 4.3.

Rule

Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides a
similar 20 day hearing requirement in the issuance of a
Protective Order.
Rule 65A provides that a Court may issue a Temporary
Restraining Order Ex Parte,
within 10 days.

subject to a hearing being held

See Rule 65A of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(such an order is subject to stringent requirements regarding
notice prior to its issuance).

While these statutes/rules
20

present a formal process for authorizing the Ex Parte Order, they
demonstrate that there are situations where the Court can issue
an Ex Parte Order without violating due process.

Taken as a

whole, the statutes/rules allow an ex parte order where it is
does not finalize the litigation and the opposing party has ar.
opportunity to have a hearing on the matter subsequent to the
order.
Appellant does not dispute that a fundamental requirement cf
due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard.

See

Mullane v. Hanover Bank and Trust, Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct.
652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

However, the United States Supreme

Court has recognized that "due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14
L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).

The question is whether the circumstances

surrounding the entry of the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order
amount to due process.
In the instant matter, the key points the District Court
failed to look at in making its conclusions is that due process
was afforded.

While, ignoring the argument above regarding

appropriate notice of the Invalidation Petition, Appellee did not
have notice that the Tribal Court could enter an order accepting
jurisdiction and changing custody, pursuant to the May 15, 1998
Juvenile Court Order.

Appellee did have a fair opportunity to
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object and fight the issues raised by the order at the June 8,
1998 hearing.
On June 8, 1998, a hearing was held and Appellee was able tc
present his arguments.

The Tribal Court stayed the proceedings

and its order pending a possible review by another Court cf the
Stay issues.

Appellee had the opportunity from June 8, 1998

until October 1, 1998 to file an appeal, a Motion, or a request
for some relief from the Court.

Appellee could have requested

relief from the Tribal Court's May 22, 1998 Order.
Despite all of Appellee's concerns regarding due process in
Tribal Court, Appellee knew that the Juvenile Court's March 3,
1998 Ex Parte Order clearly violated due process in that no
notice was given to the mother and no hearing was ever held c:i
the March 3, 1998 Ex Parte Order.
posses a valid order of custody.

Appellee knew that he did noi
Appellee had nearly a four

month window in which to file pleadings before the Tribal Court
to seek custody.

Appellee chose not to do so.

Rather Appellee

sat idly by.
Appellee's claim of custody was defective and he knew or
should have known it.

Given the Juvenile Court's May 15, 1998

Order extending the March 3, 1998 order only until the Tribal
Court accepted jurisdiction and the defective nature of the March
3, 1998 Juvenile Court Order, Appellee should have acted.

In the

subsequent proceedings, Appellee was given time to respond, but
22

chose not to do so.

Appellee was given the opportunity to file

Motions or Appeals to review the May 15, 1998 Order or obtain
custody, Appellee chose not to do sol.

Nothing precluded

Appellee from seeking temporary custody through the Tribal Ccurt.
Appellee was not denied any process, but rather denied himself of
due process.
Appellee was given sufficient due process subsequent to June
8, 1998.

In Phillips v. State Bd. of Regents, the Tennessee

Supreme Court held that while the initial notice to Phillips mayhave been defective, the hearings subsequent to the initial
notice provided Phillips with sufficient Notice and an
opportunity to be heard.

863 S.W.2d 45, 50-51 (Tenn 1993).

While Phillips involved an employee discharge, it provides a good
factual analysis which the Court can look at.

In the instant

case, the May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order was subject to
modification, it did not finalize the action.
Appellee was afforded the opportunity to defend against the
May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order in that the stay on June 8, 1998
created a situation where the order did not effectively take
effect for several months.

Appellee had a choice to file

pleadings, but chose not to do so.
on his rights.

Rather, Appellee chose to sit

By the time that the District Court heard the

matter, Appellee had over 9 months in which to have filed
something contesting the May 22, 1998 Tribal Court Order.
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Additionally, Appellee chose not to defend against Appellant's
Petition for Sole Custody which was subsequently granted by tne
Tribal Court on October 16, 1998.
Even if this Court were to determine that the May 22, 1998
Order lacked due process at the time it was issued, the
subsequent proceedings in the case remedied any problems with the
Order.

Appellant was granted sole permanent custody on October

16, 1998.

Appellee could have contested the November 19, 1996

Order to Show Cause, but chose not to appear.
Appellee was given the opportunity to file pleadings
repeatedly, but chose not to do so.

Appellee was given

procedural protections under the Tribal Court's Appellate Rules,
but did not avail himself of those protections.

By the time that

the Court heard argument on March 10, 1999, Appellee had
completely failed to participate in any meaningful way in Tribal
Court, despite ample notice of the proceedings which were
occurring.

The District Court had evidence to show that any

procedural defects that may have existed were cured by the
subsequent proceedings which gave Appellant custody.

The

subsequent Orders demonstrate that the May 22, 1998 Order of
Temporary Custody was appropriate despite Appellee's
protestations that he was denied due process.
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2.

Finality

A.

Estate of Jones Standard of Finality

The finality in the context of domestication of a foreign
order is not the same as determining the finality of a judgment
for purposes of appeal (i.e. interlocutory v. appeal of right).
In the Estate of Jones decision cited above, the Court held that
the foreign judgment (the California judgment) was "final because
the trial court judgment was not appealed."

Noting that the

foreign jurisdiction (California) provided "a specific time
period in which to appeal from the entry of judgment," the Court
found that the litigant had failed to appear or participate in
the foreign litigation, including a failure to even "attempt: to
appeal the judgment."

Id. at 98 6.

This Court's interpretation is entirely consistent with the
other provisions of the Foreign Judgment Act (the 30 day waiting
period and the stay provisions which have been argued by
Respondents previously).

These provisions allow for time to file

an appeal or to stay the enforcement if an appeal is pending.
Under this analysis, the judgment is final in that Respondents
failed to participate in the underlying litigation or challenge
the tribal court's order in any manner (i.e. filing an objection
or even a request for hearing).
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B.

Finality as to the Issue of Custody

As shown by the subsequent Tribal Court Rulings en October
16, 1998 and November 23, 1998, the issue of custody was
finalized as of March 10, 1999.

Whether the temporary custody

order does not satisfy the requirement of finality is no longer
an issue.

Even if the temporary custody order was not final, it

became final upon entry of the permanent custody Tribal Court
Order on October 16, 1998.

Even under Utah law, the temporary

custody order could have been appealed subsequent to the
determination of the custody action.

The temporary custody order

is now final and no longer subject to appeal.
C.

Laws of the State of Rendition

The applicable provisions of the Fort Peck Tribal Couri:
Rules of Appellate Procedure differ significantly from the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

(See R. at 200-05).

Unlike the

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, all appeals are labeled as
being interlocutory.

The orders which are appealable/final are

those which "involves an issue of law consistent with a violation
of due process adversely affecting the outcome of a trial on the
merits, regardless of whether the final order includes a full
determination on the merits."

See Rule 6 of Fort Peck Rules of

Appellate Procedure (See R. at 200-05).

Therefore, the temporary

custody order was final under the laws of the state of rendition
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as required under the finality prong because Appellee could have
appealed on an alleged due process violation.
CONCLUSION
The Judgment of the District Court should be either reversed
or reversed and remanded.

It should be reversed because tne

District Court erred in determining that the Utah Foreign
Judgment Act precluded an independent action to enforce rhe
judgment.

It should be reversed because the order did not lack

due process as established by the Tribal Court's subsequent
orders, or, in the alternative, remanded so that the District
Court can make a determination based upon all the evidence
presented as to subsequent facts that were available at the time
of the March 10, 1999 Hearing.

The Order should not stand as ir

was issued.
DATED this j£

day of

Szatewloz

, 2000,

llant
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,
Appellant,
>

Case No. 990726-CA

v.
Boyd Searle,
Appellee.
)

Priority 4

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ADDENDA "A"-MAY 1 5 , 1 9 9 8
JUVENILE COURT ORDER

A

^ G3*?«£

In the Third District Juvenile Court
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
State of Utah, interest of

| Ruling on Motions:

Searle, Chad (1-14-97)

Motion to Intervene
Motion to Transfer to Tribe
I Case #948405

A person under eighteen years

The above matter came before this Court pursuant to a
Verified Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of Jayni
Searle filed 2-23-98, and amended 3-19-98, filed by Petitioners,
Boyd Clark Searle and Dorothy Searle. They were represented by
Maria Cristina Santana, attorney- Subsequently, the above
Motions were filed. The Motion to Intervene was granted to the
Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes and signed by. this Court
on 3-24-98, said Motion having been filed by Gary Beaudry,
attorney for the Tribes. On behalf of the mother, Jayni Searle,
Jim Shirley, attorney, filed a Motion to Transfer said matter to
the Tribe. On 3-3-98, this Court issued an exparte temporary
order of custody and guardianship with the Petitioners pending
further hearing on their Petition for Termination.
The Court, having reviewed the documents filed and the
applicable sections of the Indian Child Welfare Reform Act,
makes the following order:
1. The Verified Petitibn to Terminate the Parental Rights
of Jayni Searle is hereby transferred to the Tribal Court, as
requested by the mother, for said Court's determination as to
whether or not it wishes to exercise jurisdiction over this
matter;
2. Pending such determination by the Tribal Court, this
Court directs that its Order of 3-3-98, placing temporary custody
and guardianship of said child with the Petitioners, shall remain
in full force and effect, and that said child remain in his
current placement until the Tri.be^'tiia'kes its determination.

- ' " t'hvi*s 1J
" ^
Dated

day of^yV'19^8^
STATE OF UTAH
: U '

019^ >A. JohknssoiV- Jxidg^
cc:

/
Pirn Shir

l(

)

\'-y:<-'-'':

.ay, attorney fob.mother
{aria Cristina"Santana,
a t t o r n e y fo r Ifetf&pnei

Jary Beaudry, a t t o r n e y for Tribes
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,
Appellant,
)

Case No. 990726-CA

v.
Boyd Searle,
Appellee.
)

Priority 4

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ADDENDA "B"-MAY 2 2 , 1 9 9 8
TRIBAL COURT ORDER

A

FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT
ASSINBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBES
FORT PECK INDIAN RESERVATION
P.O. BOX 1027
POPLAR, MONTANA 59255
(406) 768-5557

State of Utah, Third District Juvenile Court

Order Accepting Jurisdiction

In the Matter of Chad Searle,
A Minor Indian Child

(Utah case # 948405)

Upon Motion of Gary M. Beaudry, ICWA Attorney for the Fort Peck Tribes and upon review
of the court order issued by Judge Olof A. Johansson of the Third District Juvenile Court, Salt
Lake City County, State Utah, in accordance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and good
cause appearing this court issues the following:
Findings
1. This matter is an Indian Child Welfare Act Proceeding as defined under the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 as it pertains to a Termination of Parental Rights;.
2. The child subject to this proceeding is an Indian Child as defined under the Act and the
Fort Peck Tribes is the Indian Child's Tribe as defined under the Act;
3. The State court after due process issued an order transfering jurisdiction of this matter
to this Tribal court;
4. This court enjoys jurisdiction exclusive of any state court under 25 U.S.C. 1911(a).
NOWTHEREFORE it is the order of this court that:
1. The Fort Peck Tribal Court hereby accept jurisdiction and allow the child to be transported
from the State of Utah to the Fort Peck Indian Reservation by his Natural Mother, Jayni
Searle and
2. That the child shall remain under the temporary care, custody and control of his natural
mother Jayni Searle until further order of this court.
^
,
,
nd
v
Issued and dated this 22 day of May 1998.
.
' - - ~~ /
^Attest Clerk of Court

Chief Judge, A.T. Stafiie

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

Jayni Searle,
Appellant,
Case No. 990726-CA
v.
Boyd Searle,
Appellee.

y

Priority 4

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ADDENDA "C'-PETITION FOR WRIT
OF ASSISTANCE

B

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAY 2 8 1998

JIM C. SHIRLEY (#7100)
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
9 EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: (801) 359-8003

(

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF CHAD SEARLE
A MINOR INDIAN CHILD
JAYNI SEARLE,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
ASSISTANCE

Petitioner,
Case No.
vs.

BOYD SEARLE,

Judge

Respondent.

COMES NOW Petitioner, Jayni Searle, by and through counsel, Jim C. Shirley, and,
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1911(d), petitions the Court to grant a Writ of Assistance in the aboveentitled matter. The Request is based upon the following:
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL RECITALS
1.

Jayni Searle is the natural mother of Chad Searle.

2.

An action was previously commenced in Third District Juvenile Court involving
Chad Searle.

3.

Pursuant to a temporary order of custody signed on March 3,1998, Respondent,
Boyd Searle, was given temporary custody, care, and control of Chad Searle.

4.

Respondent also obtained an Ex-Parte Protective Orderfromthe Third District
Court.

5.

The Ex-Parte Protective Order was certified to the Juvenile Court by
Commissioner Arnett.

6.

Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1911(a) (Indian Child Welfare Act), exclusive jurisdiction
over the child and the proceedings was transferred to the Fort Peck Assiniboine
and Sioux Tribal Court. See Exhibit #1 (Certified Copy of the Juvenile Court
Order).

7.

The Fort Peck Tribal Court entered an order accepting jurisdiction, ordering that
Chad Searle be transported to the Fort Peck Indian Reservation by Jayni Searle,
and that temporary custody of Chad Searle be given to Jayni Searle. See Exhibit
#2 (Certified Copy of Tribal Court Order).

8.

Based upon conversations between counsel for Boyd Searle and counsel for Jayni
Searle, Boyd Searle has been unwilling to comply with the tribal court order and
surrender custody of Chad Searle to Jayni Searle for transportation.

9.

To the best of Petitioner's understanding, Chad Searle attends Arcadia Elementary
located at 3461 West 4850 South, Kearns, Utah

10.

To the best of Petitioner's knowledge, information, and belief, Chad Searle is
either residing at: (1) the residence located at 4885 South 3640 West, Kearns,
Utah; or (2) the residence located at 4906 South 4460 West, Kearns, Utah.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted "to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families." 25 U.S.C. 1902. The provisions of the Indian Child Welfare are controlling
where applicable due to the supremacy of Federal Law. Adoption of Halloway. Matter of. 732,
P.2d 962, 966 (Utah 1986). The importance of tribal primacy should be enforced by the state
courts because the tribal interest in "preserving] its identity and the traditions" by determining
"who will have the care and custody of its children." Id Under 25 U.S.C. 1911(d):
The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United States,
and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody
proceedings to the same extent that such entities give full faith and credit to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other public entity."

CONCLUSION
The Fort Peck Tribal Court has entered an order requiring the transport of Chad Searle to
the tribal reservation by Jayni Searle. This order necessitates the surrender of physical custody of
Chad Searle. Pursuant to federal law and the supremacy clause, the order of the Fort Peck Tribal
Court should be given the same full faith and credit of any order granted by a court in the state of
Utah. Third District Court should recognize and give full faith and credit to the Order of the Fort
Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribal Court pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1911(d). The tribal court has
determined that the temporary care, custody, and control of Chad Searle should vest in his
mother and that Chad Searle should be transported back to the tribal reservation. The refusal of
Boyd Searle to comply with this order is willful. The Court should issue a Writ of Assistance so
that a peace officer or law enforcement officer may enforce the order of the tribal court and
surrender the child to his mother so that he can be transported to the reservation.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court issue a Writ of Assistance directing the
Sheriff, Law Enforcement, or Constable to use any and all necessary and reasonable means to
secure the child and deliver him to Jayni Searle. All necessary and reasonable means shall
include entrance upon the premises located at: (1) the residence at 4885 South 3640 West,
Kearns, Utah; (2) the residence at 4906 South 4460 West, Kearns, Utah; or (3) Arcadia
Elementary at 3461 West 4850 South, Kearns, Utah and execute upon the attached Order.
DATED THIS P r^clay of

jAm

A

, 1998.

T

JINVC. SHIRLEY
Attorney for Jayni Searle
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On this

_ day of

//la.

A,

1998 I mailed, postage pre-paid First Class,

a copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Assistance to:
Maria Christina Santana
Santana Law Firm
Attorney for Petitioner
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Beaudry, Gary
Beaudry Law Offices
322 Main Street, Suite 102
Williston, North Dakota 58802-2141

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,
Appellant,
Case No. 990726-CA
v.
Boyd Searle,
Appellee.
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Priority 4
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ADDENDA "D"-COVERSHEET

C

COVER SHEET FOR CIVIL ACTIONS
PARTY IDENTIFICATION (ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER
Name oauiM &«•&<
Address rojrf Pick- Tfit^l /Ztsarutfbc.*
Day Time Telephone <s

ATTY FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER
Name <J7n^> <C 54<rte^
Address^ UU^
fki , <>d± &&
SA(I- UU &U Oi*L fyM
Day Time Telephone £fc>< 3S<? S o o x

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER
Name
Address

ATTY FOR PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER
Name
Address

Day Time Telephone

Day Time Telephone

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
NameT*^
%or\^
Address tfioC So *&< H^CD U^S"T

ATTY FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
<
Name /^fc«-»<s.
?GJT&I.\C^
Address 2 / 5 9 £e*r£ ?co £«*rf

Day Time Telephone

Day Time Telephone

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
Name h^-r{ v'ix,k TV* \><LS
Address fc«-r B_tfc. fr > l>± pc f^v teZ^

ATTY FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT
Name <£<<-^
'^c^Jt-,
Addressj£ ^ - JHx, ^ &+«** £ v ff* # 0

Day Time Telephone

Day Time Telephone

TOTAL CLAIM FOR DAMAGES

JURY DEMAND

£./<< A-4 6-/v u+*h 7^(04,
Y

D

$ _

SCHEDULE OF FEES:

§21-5.

Yes

J^T No

CHECK ANY THAT APPLY. (SEE CASE TYPES FOR

FILING FEES FOR COMPLAINTS OTHER THAN CLAIM FOR DAMAGES)

a

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

a
a
a

Civil, Interpleader or Small
Claims: $2000 or less
Small Claims: $2001-$5000
Civil or Interpleader: $2001-$9999

$37
$60
$80

a
a
a

Civil or Interpleader: $10,000 $120
and over
Civil Unspecified
$120
-— MISCELLANEOUS —
Jury Demand
$50
Vital Statistics §26-2-25
$2

COVER SHEET FOR CIVIL ACTIONS
:ASETYPE (CHECK ONLY ONE CATEGORY)

ie

Case Type

APPEALS
120 D AA
70 D AP

—
120
;ch
1120
>ch
>ch
>50

BD
CV
CD
CN
DC

Attorney Discipline
Civil Rights
Condemnation
Contract
Debt Collection
Expungement (Fee is $0 under
circumstances of §77-18-10(2))
>ch D EV
Forcible Entry and Detainer
!120 D MI
Forfeiture of Property
Sch Q CV
Interpleader
Sch • LM
Lien/Mortgage Foreclosure
Sch D MP
Malpractice
5ch Q CV
Miscellaneous Civil
il20 D WR
Extradordinary Relief
Sch Q PI
Personal Injury
5120 D HC
Post Conviction Relief: Capital
5120 Q HC
Post Conviction Relief: Noncapital
Sch D PD
Property Damage
Sch D PR/QT Property /Quiet Title
Sch D CV
Sexual harassment
Sch D SC
Small Claims
Sch D TP
Tax
Sch Q PR
Water Rights
Sch D WD
Wrongful Death
Sch Q CV
Wrongful Termination

—$0
5120
5120
580

DOMESTIC
D
D
Q
Q

N120 D PA
580 Q SM

Cohabitant Abuse
Common Law Marriage
Custody/Visitation/Support
Divorce/Annulment
Check if child support, custody or
visitation will be part of decree
Paternity
Separate Maintenance

tPfl

r n i f n r m Child Cusforiv

n

SA
CV
CS
DA
Q

rS

Case Type

$120 a CS

Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act (UIFS A)

Administrative Agency Review
Small Claims Trial de Novo

GENERAL CIVIL
Q
Q
Q
Q
D
D

Fee

- - TTTnr , FTVfTrMTQ
JUUVjILlVIlldN l o

$25 a FJ

Abstract of Foreign Judgment
or Decree
Abstract of Judgment or Order
of Utah Court or Agency
Abstract of Judgement or Order
of Utah State Tax Commission
Judgment by Confession
Renew Judgment

$40 a AJ
$30 a TL
$25 a AJ
$o a AJ

PROBATE
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120
$120

a
a
a
a
a
•
a
a
a
a
a

Adoption
Conservatorship
Estate Personal Rep - Formal
Estate Personal Rep - Informal
Guardianship
Involuntary Commitment
Minor's Settlement
Name Change
Supervised Administration
Trusts
Unspecified Probate

AD
GC
ES
ES
GC
MH
OT
NC
OT
TR
OT

C p i r r ' T A T TVyfATTT7TJC

$o a MI
$25 a MI
$o a CRIM
$o a MI
$o a MH
$0 D CRIM
$25 T MI

$0 a HL
$25 a MI
S25 3 MI

Administrative Search Warrant
Arbitration Award
Criminal Investigation Search
Warrant
Deposit of Will
Determination of Competency in
Criminal Case
Extradition
Foreign Probate or Child
Custody Document
Hospital Lien
Judicial Approval of Document
not part of a Pending Case
Notice of Deposition in
out-of-state case
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FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
Jayni Searle,
Appellant,
Case No. 990726-CA
v.
Boyd Searle,
Appellee.
1

Priority 4

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ADDENDA "E"-OCTOBER 1 6 , 1998
TRIBAL COURT ORDER

D

pl

JAYNI SEARLE
PROSE
P.O. BOX 702
WOLF POINT, MONTANA 59201

u

LB
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In the Matter of Chad Searie,
Minor Indian Child,

) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
) OF LAW, AND DECREE
) Case No.
517
)
)

Jayni Searie,

) Judge
Plaintiff.

)

'Sftfk4 ^ ^

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Jayni Searte's Petition for
Restoration of Custody. An entry of, notice of, and application for default having been entered
for Respondent's failure to answer the Petition in a timely manner. An Affidavit of Residence
and Grounds having been filed by Jayni Searie. The Court having reviewed the file and having
made its decision, now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Chad Searie is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to a ruling by
Judge Stafne that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction.
2.

in |]

! OCT'IBM P j j

FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT
ASSINIBOINE AND SIOUX TRIBES

1.

i3

Chad Searie is a native American child and a member or eligible for membership
in the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes.

3.

Jayni Searie is a biological mother of Chad Searie.

4.

Temporary custody of Chad was awarded by the Court to Jayni Searie on May
22, 1998.

5.

The emotional father of Chad Searie died in February of 1998.

6.

Since then, Boyd and Dorothy Searie have wrongfully maintained custody in
contravention of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et. seq.) and this

]

Court's order or nrfay 22,1998.
7.

Boyd and Dorothy Searie are the emotional grandparents and currently have
physical custody despite the Court's order.

8.

Boyd and Dorothy Searie have petitioned the court to dismiss the termination
action pending in tribal court. See Attached exhibit #1.

9.

Jayni Searie is a person fit to assume custody on the afore-mentioned child.

10.

Jayni Searie and Chad Searie enjoy the relationship of mother and child.

11.

Jayni Searie and Chad Searie have a normal parent-child bond which has been
drastically impacted by the emotional grandparents.

BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The matter is properly before the Court pursuant to tribal code.

2.

Jayni and Chad Searie are members or eligible for membership in the Fort Peck
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes.

3.

Jayni Searie is domiciled on the reservation.

4.

Chad Searie, pursuant to law and tribal custom, became domiciled on the
reservation due to the death of his physical custodian and emotional father, Boyd
Carl Searie.

5.

Jayni Searie is a frt and appropriate person who should be awarded custody

BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby
iters the following:
DECREE AND ORDER
1.

Chad Searie is hereby placed in the permanent custody, care, and control of
Jayni Searie, his natural and biological mother.

2.

The previous order requinng transfer of Chad Searie to the reservation is hereby
continued.

Law enforcement is hereby directed to remove the child and return him to the
reservation.
SIGNED THIS
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FORT PECK TRIBAL C O U R T
ASSINIBOINE A N D SIOUX TRIBES
In the Matter of Chad Searle,

)

A Minor Indian Child.

)

CAUSE

Jayni Searle,

)

Case No.

Plaintiff.

)

ORDER RE: ORDER TO SHOW

L^ I T "

Judge 5 r n v £ \ l FT

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for hearing on an Order to
Show Cause on the 19tK Day of November, 1998. Present for the hearing was Jayni
Searle. The Court notes that Boyd and Dorothy Searle were personally served with
notice of the hearing and the Order to Show Cause by certified, return receipt, U.S.
mail. The Court notes futher that counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina
Santana, was served by certified, return receipt U.S. mail. The Court, having heard
testimony from Jayni Searle and argument and having fully reviewed the file, enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Chad Searle is an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act.

2.

Jayni Searle is an Indian parent as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act

3.

Jayni Searle is domiciled on the reservation.

4.

Boyd Carl Searle was Chad Searle's emotional father, having been
deemed so by his own admission in a divorce action in the Third District
Court.

5.

On February 1998, Boyd Carl Searle died.

6.

Chad Searle was in the custody of his emotional father, Boyd Carl Searle,
when the emotional father died.

7.

The emotional grandparents, Boyd and Dorothy Searle filed a Petition to

Terminate Poiental Rights of Jayni Searie in the . ..,rd District Court in
Salt Lake County for the State of Utah.
8.

On March 3rd, 1998, Boyd and Dorothy Searie obtained temporary
custody of Chad through order of the Third District Juvenile Court of
Utah.

9.

Boyd and Dorothy Searie also filed a Petition for Protective Order.

10.

Subsequent to that order, Jayni Searie retained private counsel, Mr. Jim
C. Shirley of Salt Lake City, Utah.

11.

Mr. Shirley obtained a copy of the March 3rtl, 1998 order. He
subsequently received copies of the other documents. This transpired
after the order of temporary custody was entered by the juvenile court.
Boyd and Dorothy Searie did not sen/e Jayni Searie or the Fort Peck
Tribes with Notice prior to obtaining the temporary custody order in
juvenile court or the protective order in district court.

12.

The Petition for Protective Order was certified from Utah's Third District
Court to Utah's Third District Juvenile Court.

13.

Mr. Shirley sent courtesy copies of the pleadings to Mr. Gary Beaudry,
counsel for the Fort Peck Tribes. Prior to receipt of these courtesy copies,
the tribe had not been notified of the proceedings as required by I.C.W.A.

14.

Ms. Searie filed a Petition to transfer the proceedings to tribal court under
25 U.S.C. 1911(b) in the juvenile court, alleging concurrent jurisdiction.

15.

Ms. Searie subsequently filed an Amended Petition to transfer under 25
U.S.C. 1911(a) in the juvenile court, alleging exclusive jurisdiction.

16.

Ms. Searie filed a Petition to invalidate the improperly entered custody

oruei, wwi£

17.
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Boyd and Dorothy Searle filed a Response to the Amended Petition to
Transfer, alleging that domicile had not changed at the death of the
emotional father and that Jayni Searle abandoned the child, Chad
Searle.

18.

Ms. Searle filed a Reply which cited to case law which demonstrated
that under common law domicile did change at the death of a custodian
to the surviving natural parent and which alleged grounds to demonstrate
that Ms. Searle had not abandoned the child.

19.

On May 15tk, 1998, the Third District Juvenile Court, in and for the state
of Utah issued an order transferring jurisdiction to the tribal court.

20.

On May 22n<L 1998, this Court found that it has exclusive jurisdiction and
accepted jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court invalidated the previous
order granting custody to Boyd and Dorothy Searle and ordered that the
child be brought back to the reservation and placed in the temporary
custody of the natural mother.

21.

On the 3A Day of June, 1998, the Third District Juvenile Court entered
an order staying its May 15tk, 1998 order.

22.

On June 8tkf 1998, the tribal and juvenile courts issues stays of the
proceedings pending hearing before an appeals or federal court on the
issue of whether the juvenile court had any jurisdiction to enter such
an order.

23.

Ms. Searle caused to be filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals in and
for Utah.

24.

On August 31st, 1998, counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle signed a

voluntary dismissal of the Petition to Terminate.
25.

On the 1 st Day of September, 1998, the Court of Appeals found that the
Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction to enter any orders.

26.

On the 8tk Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle filed a Petition for Sole
Custody.

27.

Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Santana, was served with
this Petition for Sole Custody.

28.

On the 9tk Day of September, 1998, Jayni Searle filed a Stipulation to
Dismiss Action Brought by Boyd and Dorothy Searle.

29.

On the 9tL Day of September, 1998, the Court granted Boyd and Dorothy
Searle's voluntary dismissal but specifically ordered that "the previous
order of temporary custody entered by this Court on May 22nd, 1998, is
hereby continued with Jayni Searle."

30.

Counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle were served with the stipulation and
the order.

31.

Jayni Searle subsequently filed an Notice of Entry of Default, Entry of
Default, and Application for Entry of Default. All these documents were
served on counsel for Boyd and Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana,
by U.S. Mail.

32.

The Court entered a default and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Decree. The decree was served on counsel for Boyd and
Dorothy Searle, Maria Christina Santana, by U.S. Mail.

33.

Jayni Searle subsequently filed a Corrected Notice of Entry of Default.
Corrected Entry of Default, and Corrected Application for Entry of Default.

All these doci

jnts were served on counsel for D<

and Dorothy

Searle, Maria Christina Santana, by U.S. mail.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby enters its:
Conclusions of Law

1.

Chad Searle is an Indian Child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act.

2.

The Court previously entered a finding and conclusion of exclusive
jurisdiction under 25 U S.C. 1911 (a) based upon the fact that upon the
death of the custodian/emotional father, domicile of Chad Searle became
that of his mother pursuant to tribal custom and well-established common
law The Court previously rejected Boyd and Dorothy Searle's contentions as mentless.

3

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the issues of custody and
contempt before it The Indian Child Welfare Act applies to the case at
hand Tribal court is the proper forum for any litigation involving the
custody of an Indian child which is not the result of a divorce action or
delinquency matter The Court obtained jurisdiction originally due to the
transfer of the litigation involving the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights
At the time the Petition to Terminate Parental Right was withdrawn, the
Court retained jurisdiction due to a pending Petition for Sole Custody filed
by Jayni Searle which was filed prior to the stipulation allowing dismissal
The Court continues to enjoy exclusive jurisdiction The Court has
original jurisdiction over the custody matter involving Chad Searle due to
the filing of the Petition for Sole Custody Jurisdiction has never been
terminated by the Court as contended by the emotional grandparents,

soya and [
4.

Jthy Searle.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over Jayni Searle and Chad Searle as
domiciliaries of the reservation pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act.

5.

The court has personal jurisdiction over Boyd and Dorothy Searle that was
acquired when litigation involving the termination of parental right action
was transferred to Tribal Court. See 92 Corpus Juris Secundum, Venue
SS 207 (the court receiving the transfer of jurisdiction/venue "thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter, all the parties
thereto, and ail matters incident thereto, and it may inquire into
matters connected with the subject matter of the action").

6.

Additionally, the Court has jurisdiction due to emotional grandparents
voluntary filing of pleadings before the Court. The Rules of Tribal Procedure require that the party file a special and limited appearance if they
do not wish to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the tribal court.
Boyd and Dorothy Searle failed to file any special and limited appearance
as required.

7.

Jayni Searle having satisfied her burden by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that:
a.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle were served with a true and correct
copy of the Order to Show Cause;

b.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully failed to comply
with the Court's order to appear and produce the child;

c.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle voluntarily and willfully failed to comply
with the Court's May 22nd, 1998 order to surrender physical
custody of the child, and

d.

that Boyd and Dorothy Searle had the cap&w.»y to comply with the
Court's orders.

BASED upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby enters the
following:

ORDER
1.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle are hereby held in contempt of Court;

2.

The Court will stay the jail time if and when Boyd and Dorothy Searle
agree to bring Chad to the reservation as previously ordered;

3.

A bench warrant is issued for the immediate detention and transport
of Boyd and Dorothy Searle to jail;

4.

The Court will lift the Bench Warrant if and when Boyd and Dorothy
Searle contact the court, agree to return the child to the reservation,
and make suitable arrangements for the transport of Chad Searle to
the reservation;

5.

A bench warrant is issued for the immediate detention and transport
of Chad Searle to the reservation;

6.

The court will lift the Bench Warrant upon Chad Searle's return to the
custody of his mother;

7.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle be required to reimburse the tribe for costs
incurred in the Fort Peck Tribe's effort to secure the release and return
of Chad Searle to the reservation;

8.

The Fort Peck Tribes are ordered to provide the Court with a specific
amount;

9.

Boyd and Dorothy Searle are ordered to pay Jayni Searle for

reasonable attorneys fees incurred; and
10.

Jayni Searle is instructed to secure a list of attorneys fees
incurred.

DATED THIS A ^ D A Y OF /{Jh^V^

. 1998 .

FORT PECK TRIBAL COURT

JUDGE

Certificate of Mailing
A
, I ^ciunuaie OT Mailing
On this_Qft__day of ) \ Q \ J
. 1998 I deposited in the United States Mail,
postage prepaid, a true and correct signed copy of the foregoing Order Re:

Order to Show Cause to:
Maria Christina Santana
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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ADDENDA " G " - T r a n s c r i p t

F

Portion

1

out of context.

What the specific issue was was that the

2

tribal court found exclusive jurisdiction.

3

indicated that, as to that issue, there was due process in

4

the state court.

And Beaudry

So I don't think he ever said that they had no

5
6

right to due process in tribal court.

7

I've seen the tribal courts come into Utah from out of

8
9
10

state to litigate matters.

15
16

So I don't believe that he said

meant that way.
So I believe like I've argued all the rest of the
issues, and I'll just submit it, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

13
14

—

that or that, if it was understood that way, that it was

11
12

And in fact, on

The record needs to clearly reflect

that the Court's decision today goes to the order issued by
the Ft. Peck Tribal Court dated May 22, 1998, a copy of
which was attached to the original petition for writ of

17

assistance.

18

petition for writ of assistance and was not commenced in a

19

fashion that generally would be handled in enforcing a

20

foreign order, and that is through Section 78-22 (a)-1 in

21

the following sections of the Utah Code Annotated, which

22

specifically designated how one domesticates a foreign

23

J udgment,

24
25

This action was commenced by the filing of a

The Ft. Peck trial order is clearly a foreign
judgment, same as the State of Nevada or State of Colorado

31

1

or any place else.

2

therefore, bring into power --or bring into play the

3

powers of this Court to issue orders, one must follow the

4

J foreign judgment act which provides for the domestication

5
6
7

of those judgments.

10
11
12

the appropriate procedures outlined in that act.
Once it's domesticated, then the -- then this
Court issues whatever orders are necessary in the same
fashion as it would the domestication of any other foreign
judgment, unless there's a showing that the foreign
judgment was obtained without due process.
With regard to the May 22, 1998 order, while

13
14
15
16

It's not difficult, one just has to

I file the appropriate documents and give notice following

8
g

It's -- and to domesticate and,

there may have -- while Boyd Searle may have notice of the
foreign judgment at this point in time and may have had an
opportunity to -- this case has been in every court in the

17

state except the federal court.

18

there too.

19

Maybe we can get it over

But in any event, the Foreign Judgment Act has

20

not been complied with as to the order of May 22, 1998.

21

Even if it had been complied with, strictly complied with,

22

and it must be, the only thing I've heard here and the only

23
24
25

thing I can garner from this record is that the tribal
court issued an order changing custody after it accepted
jurisdiction, and that's fine, it likely has jurisdiction

32

T | in this matter.

But it issued an order without giving

2 I Mr. Searle any notice.
3

fact doesn't rise to a level of due process

4
5

And saying they fixed it after the

He was entitled to an opportunity to have notice
of the hearing that would be heard before an order was

6

J issued on May 22, 1998, and he was not.

7

[ that's sought to be enforced here, and I decline to do so

8

I because it wasn't due process,
If this order had been issued by the State of

g

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

That's the order

Colorado, I wouldn't enforce it and for the same reasons,
no notice.
So as to the matter before me today, and that is
whether or not a petition for writ of assistance will issue
or should issue from this court, based upon the tribal
court order of May 22, 1998, the petition is denied.
Now, so we don't get down here in some other area

17

with regard to a subsequent order that may have been issued

18

with n o t i c e , l e t me make i t c l e a r what's going t o have to

19
20

happen in this case.
This action, in its entirety, is dismissed

21

because there has been no foreign judgment that has been

22

properly domesticated in this case.

23

Mr. Shirley, if you want to domesticate a foreign

24

judgment beyond the one of May 22, 1998, you're going to

25

have to follow 78-22 (a)-1 and domesticate whatever foreign

33

judgment you may have and with a proper pleading, in the
first instance, giving Mr. Searle an opportunity to be
heard.

Assuming that the Court is satisfied that due

process attaches to any subsequent order, then once that
order -- once a foreign order is domesticated, then this
Court, or wherever else you may file it, will issue the
appropriate orders.
But I am not going to issue, even if I was
satisfied there were due process, an order for assistance
based upon a subsequent filing following that original
filing.

It just -- you're just going to have to follow the

Foreign Judgment Act before --at least before you get me
to enforce it.

Maybe you can convince one of my colleagues

in this court to do so, but not me.
So what I'm telling you is that, even though
there may be some request on the part of the petitioner
here, Jayni Searle, to have this Court consider a
subsequent order following May 22, 1998 in tribal court,
I'm not going to do it until that order is properly
domesticated in the courts with 22(a) of Title 78. And
that requires a new action.
This case is dismissed in its entirety.
Ms. Santana, prepare an appropriate order.
MS. SANTANA:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

With findings of fact that clearly

34

indicate that I'm satisfied the May 22, 1998 order has not
been properly domesticated with the Foreign Judgment Act.
And, number two, that the materials that have been
presented to me here, both in oral argument and with the
file, indicate that Mr. Searle was given no notice and no
opportunity to be heard with regard to the orders that were
issued by the tribal court on May 22 of 1998.
And further, I want a further indication that
because no order has --no foreign order has been
domesticated, this action is dismissed in its entirety
without prejudice, at least as to the subsequent -- the
subsequent orders.
Ms. Searle is entitled to domesticate the tribal
court orders that came after May 22, 1998, if she does it
properly.

And if she files and domesticates a foreign

judgment properly by filing an appropriate action with this
court or this district, then we will deal with it in
accordance with the law.

But we're not going to do it

backwards and then find ourselves in some appellate court
two years from now having them saying, "What's Hanson doing
issuing orders based upon a foreign judgment that was never
properly domesticated?"

We're going to do this right from

the start.
Prepare an appropriate order.
MS. SANTANA:

Thank you, Your Honor.

35

1

2
3

(Whereupon, a t t h e hour of 11:45 a . m . ,
t h e h e a r i n g was c o n c l u d e d . )
-oooOooo-
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Appellant,
)

Case No. 990726-CA

v.
Boyd Searle,
Appellee.

]
]
Priority 4

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ADDENDA " H " - D i s t r i c t Court
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.niFd Judicial District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF CHAD SEARLE,
A MINOR INDIAN CHILD

:

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

:

CASE NO. 980905344

JAYNI SEARLE,
Petitioner,
vs.
BOYD SEARLE,
Respondent.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 8,
1999 for hearing on petitioner's Petition for Writ of Assistance.
Jim C. Shirley appeared representing petitioner, Jayni Searle.
Maria Cristina Santana appeared
Searle.

representing respondent, Boyd

Boyd Searle personally appeared.

The parties have filed

extensive pleadings regarding the issues before the Court, the
parties made their respective arguments. The Court having reviewed
the file, having properly considered all the oral and written
arguments submitted to the Court by the parties, the Court hereby
makes the following:

A A

i r r\

SEARLE V, SEARLE

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

PAGE TWO

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In February of 1998, respondent

filed in the Third

District Juvenile Court a Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights
of Jayni Searle in relation to Chad Searle.
2.

Subsequently, respondent filed an Ex Parte Motion for

Custody and obtained an Ex Parte Order of Temporary Custody on
March 3, 1998.
3.

Petitioner filed a Petition to Transfer to Tribal Court

in March of 1998.
4.

The

Third

Johansson, presiding,

District

Juvenile

transferred

Court,

jurisdiction

Judge

Olof

A.

over a pending

Petition for Termination to the Fort Peck Tribal Court.
5.

The Fort Peck Tribal Court accepted jurisdiction and

transferred custody of the minor child on May 22, 1998.
6.

Boyd Searle was not provided notice that the Fort Peck

Tribal Court would issue an Order on the issue of custody.
7.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Assistance with

this Court seeking assistance of this Court in enforcing the May
22, 1998 Fort Peck Tribal Court custody Order.

SEARLE V. SEARLE

8.
regarding

PAGE THREE

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The parties have subsequently filed numerous pleadings
the

appropriateness

of

the

issuance

of

a Writ of

Assistance.
9.

Petitioner also subsequently filed a Motion to give Full

Faith and Credit to two subsequent Tribal Court Orders.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby
enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The May 22, 1998 Order of the Fort Peck Tribal Court

transferring custody from respondent to petitioner is a foreign
j udgment.
2.

As a foreign judgment, the judgment must be filed in

accordance with the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann.,
Section 78-22a-l, et seq.
3.

The Petition for Writ of Assistance does not comply with

the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
4.

Petitioner was entitled to be heard at a hearing prior to

the transfer of custody by the Fort Peck Tribal Court.
5.

The failure to give respondent an opportunity to be heard

at a hearing prior to transfer of custody constitutes a violation
of respondent's due process rights.

n n

SEARLE V. SEARLE

6.

PAGE FOUR

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

As such, the May 22, 1998 Order transferring custody is

not entitled to full faith and credit.
7.

The subsequent Tribal Court Orders are not before the

Court under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court hereby enters the following:
ORDER
1.

The Petition for Writ of Assistance is denied.

2.

The action is dismissed with prejudice as to the Fort

Peck Tribal Court May 22, 1998 Order.
3.

The above-entitled action is dismissed without prejudice

as to any Order entered subsequent to the May 22, 1998 Order which
has been entered by the Fort Peck Tribal Court and the dismissal of
this

action

in

no

way

precludes

subsequent

enforcement

of

subsequent Orders through a filing under the/Jtah Foreign Judgment
Act, and which are otherwise enforceable finder law^
Dated this

.day of July, 1999./
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PAGE FIVE

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order of Dismissal, postage prepaid, to the following,
this ^ d a y of July, 1999:

Jim C. Shirley
Attorney for Petitioner
9 Exchange Place, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Maria Cristina Santana
Attorney for Respondent
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Gary Beaudry
Attorney for Fort Peck Tribes
322 Main Street, Suite 102
Williston, North Dakota 58802-2141
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